Abstract. This paper presents two types of cryptanalysis on a MerkleDamgård hash based MAC, which computes a MAC value of a message M by Hash(K M ) with a shared key K and the message length . This construction is often called LPMAC. Firstly, we present a distinguishing-H attack against LPMAC instantiating any narrow-pipe Merkle-Damgård hash function with O(2 n/2 ) queries, which indicates the incorrectness of the widely believed assumption that LPMAC instantiating a secure hash function should resist the distinguishing-H attack up to 2 n queries. In fact, all of the previous distinguishing-H attacks considered dedicated attacks depending on the underlying hash algorithm, and most of the cases, reduced rounds were attacked with a complexity between 2 n/2 and 2 n . Because it works in generic, our attack updates these results, namely full rounds are attacked with O(2 n/2 ) complexity. Secondly, we show that an even stronger attack, which is a powerful form of an almost universal forgery attack, can be performed on LPMAC. In this setting, attackers can modify the first several message-blocks of a given message and aim to recover an internal state and forge the MAC value. For any narrowpipe Merkle-Damgård hash function, our attack can be performed with O(2 n/2 ) queries. These results show that the length prepending scheme is not enough to achieve a secure MAC.
Introduction
Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a cryptographic technique which produces the integrity of the data and the authenticity of the communication player. MACs take a message and a key as input and compute a MAC value which is often called tag. Suppose that a sender and a receiver share a secret key K in advance. When the sender sends a message M to the receiver, he computes a tag σ and sends a pair of (M, σ). The receiver computes a tag by using the shared key K and the received M . If the result matches with the received σ, he knows that he received the correct message and it was surely sent by the sender.
MACs are often constructed by using block-ciphers or hash functions. There are three basic MAC constructions based on hash functions which were analyzed by Tsudik [1] . Let H be a hash function. A secret-prefix method computes a tag of a message M by H(K M ). A secret-suffix method computes a tag by H(M K). A hybrid method computes a tag by H(K M K). Among the above three, the secret-prefix method is known to be vulnerable when H processes M block by block by iteratively applying a compression function h. This attack is called padding attack in [1] and length-extension attack in the recent SHA-3 competition [2] . Assume that the attacker obtains the tag σ for a message M . He then, without knowing the value of K and M , can compute a tag σ for a message M z for any z by computing σ ← h(σ, z).
LPMAC was suggested to avoid the vulnerability of the secret-prefix method [1] 1 . In LPMAC, the length of the message to be hashed is prepended before the message is hashed, that is to say, σ ← H(K M ), where is the length of M . K is often padded to be a multiple of the block-length so that the computation of M can start from a new block. The length prepending scheme can be regarded as a concrete construction of the prefix freeness introduced by Bellare et al. [4] . Therefore, by [4] , LPMAC was proven to be a secure pseudo-random function (PRF) up to O(2 n/2 ) queries.
The security of MAC is usually discussed with respect to the resistance against the following forgery attacks. An existential forgery attack creates a pair of valid (M, σ) for a message M which is not queried yet. A selective forgery attack creates a pair of valid (M, σ) where M is chosen by the attacker prior to the attack. A universal forgery attack creates a pair of valid (M, σ) where M can be any message chosen prior to the attack. Variants of these forgery attacks can also be considered. For example, Dunkelman et al. introduced an almost universal forgery attack [5] against the ALRED construction, which the attacker can modify one message block in M . In addition, the security against distinguishing attacks are also evaluated on MAC constructions. Kim et al. introduced two distinguishing attacks called distinguishing-R and distinguishing-H [6] . Let R and r be random functions which have the same domain as H and h, respectively. Moreover, we denote the hash function H instantiating a compression function f by H f . In the distinguishing-R attack, the attacker distinguishes a MAC H(K, M ) from R(K, M ). On the other hand, in the distinguishing-H attack, the attacker distinguishes
Regarding the distinguishing-R attack, Preneel and van Oorschot [7] presented a generic attack against MACs with a Merkle-Damgård like iterative structure, which requires O(2 n/2 ) queries. In [7] , it was explicitly mentioned that the same attack could be applied to LPMAC. Chang and Nandi later discussed its precise complexity when a long message is used [8] . The distinguishing-R attack is immediately converted to the existential forgery attack with the same complexity. On the other hand, no generic attack is known for the distinguishing-H attack, and it is widely believed that the complexity of the distinguishing-H at- 
Ours
Our attack also requires 2 n/2 offline computations and a memory to store 2 n/2 tags. The attack can be memoryless with 6 · 2 n/2 queries and 2 (n/2)+1 offline computations.
tack against a MAC instantiating a securely designed hash algorithm H h should cost 2 n complexity. There are several cryptanalytic results on MAC constructions. Although several results are known for block-cipher based MACs e.g. [5, 9, 10] , in this paper, we focus our attention on hash function based MACs. A notable work in this field is the one proposed by Contini and Yin, which presented distinguishing and key recovery attacks on HMAC/NMAC with several underlying hash functions [11] . After that, several improved results were published [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . Another important work is the one proposed by Wang et al. [17] , which presented the first distinguishing-H attack on HMAC-MD5 in the single-key setting. In this attack framework, the number of queries principally cannot be below 2 n/2 because the birthday attack is used. With the techniques of [17] , a series of distinguishing-H attacks on LPMAC were presented against SHA-1, SHA-256, and the RIPEMDfamily [18, 19, 3, 20] . The attack results are summarized in Table 1 . Note that the notion of the almost universal forgery attack was firstly mentioned by [5] , while some of previous attacks e.g. [10] can directly be applied for this scenario.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose generic attacks on LPMAC instantiating any narrowpipe Merkle-Damgård hash function. We firstly propose a distinguishing-H attack with 3 · 2 n/2 queries, 2 n/2 offline computations, and a memory to store 2 n/2 tags. Our attack updates the previous results, namely full rounds are attacked with O(2 n/2 ) complexity. Moreover, the attack can be memoryless by using the technique in [21, Remark9.93] . The complexity of our attack is listed in Table 1 .
Our attack is based on a new technique which makes an internal collision starting from two different length-prepend values, and recovers an internal state value with queries of different lengths. This approach is completely different from previous attacks on LPMAC, which utilize the existence of a high-probability
Fig. 2. Sketch of Almost Universal Forgery Attack
differential path of an underlying compression function. The idea of our technique is depicted in Fig. 1 . The outline is as follows. We start from two length-prepend values; one is for 2-block messages and the other is for 3-block messages. With a very high probability, the internal states H 1 and H 1 will be different values. Assume that we can easily obtain paired messages (
and h(H 1 , M 1 ) form an internal collision. Then, we can obtain the value of H 4 (= σ ), which is the output of the last compression function, by querying
In addition, we can obtain the value of H 3 (= σ), which is the input of the last compression function by querying M 1 M 2 . Because we obtain all input and output information for the last compression function, we can judge whether h is the target algorithm or not by comparing h(σ, M 3 ) and σ . As mentioned before, the length prepending scheme is known to be prefixfree. However, an internal collision with different length-prepend values have the same effect as the prefix. In fact, in Fig. 1 
This shows that the core of the security of LPMAC, which is the pre-fix freeness, can be totally broken with O(2 n/2 ) queries. We then further extend the technique to mount an even stronger attack against LPMAC, which is called an almost universal forgery attack. In this attack, for a given t-block message M 1 M 2 · · · M t , we assume the attacker's ability to modify the first d message blocks where d = log t into the value of his
Moreover, in our attack, the attacker can reveal the internal state value. The main idea is constructing a multi-collision starting from various different length-prepend values, which is depicted in Fig. 2 . This enables the attacker to deal with various undetermined length-prepend values (1, . . . , t) in advance. To construct the multi-collision, we use the diamond structure proposed by Kelsey and Kohno for the herding attack [22] .
Paper Outline
In Sect. 2, we introduce LPMAC and briefly summarize related work. In Sect. 3, we explain our generic distinguishing-H attack. In Sect. 4, we explain our generic almost universal forgery attack. In Sect. 5, we conclude this paper.
Related Work

LPMAC with Narrow-Pipe Merkle-Damgård Hash Functions
LPMAC is a hash function based MAC construction observed by Tsudik [1] to prevent the so called length-extension attack on the secret-prefix MAC. In LPMAC, the length of the message to be hashed is prepended before the message is hashed, that is to say, σ ← H(K M ), where is the length of M .
Most of widely used hash functions adopt the Merkle-Damgård domain extension with the narrow-pipe structure and the MD-strengthening. In this scheme, the input message M is first padded to be a multiple of the block-length by the padding procedure. Roughly speaking, a single bit '1' is appended to M , and then a necessary number of '0's are appended. Finally, the length of M is appended. Note that this padding scheme is not only the one, and replacing it with another padding scheme e.g. split padding [23] is possible. However, we only use it in this paper because it is the most common. The padded message is divided into message blocks M 0 , M 1 , . . . , M t−1 with the block size of b bits. Then, the hash value of size n is computed by iteratively updating the chaining variable of size n bits with the compression function h defined as {0,
where IV is an n-bit pre-specified value. Finally, H t is the hash value of M . In this paper, for simplicity, we assume that K is always padded to be 1-block long. Note that all of our attacks can work without this assumption by fixing remaining message bits in the first block to some constant value, say 0.
Summary of Previous Analyses on MAC Algorithms
To distinguish the target compression function h from a random function r, previous distinguishing-H attacks exploited a high probability differential path on h. Assume that a good near-collision path exists, namely there exists (∆, ∆ ) such that h(c, m) ⊕ h(c, m ⊕ ∆) = ∆ holds with probability p where p > 2 −n for a randomly chosen c and m. Then, h is distinguished by querying 1/p paired messages with difference ∆ and checking whether the output difference is ∆ . To construct a high probability differential path, we usually need the difference of the input chaining variable (pseudo-near collision). However, because the MAC computation starts from the secret information, it is hard to generate a specific difference on intermediate chaining variables, and is also hard to detect it only from the tag values. Wang et al. [17] solved these problems by using the birthday attack to generate a specific difference of an intermediate chaining variables and efficiently detect it only by changing the next message block. Previous distinguishing-H attacks on LPMAC [18, 19, 3, 20] used the similar idea as [17] . As long as the birthday attack is used to generate an intermediate difference, the attack complexity is between 2 n/2 and 2 n .
Multi-Collision Attack
The naive method to construct a multi-collision is too expensive. For narrow-pipe Merkle-Damgård hash functions, several generic attacks to construct a multicollision are known; collisions of sequential blocks [24] , collisions with a fixed point [25] , an expandable message [26] , a diamond structure [22] , and multi-pipe diamonds [27] . These are the methods to attack hash functions, which no secret exists in the computation. Because our attack is targeting MAC with secret information, we should choose the most suitable construction carefully.
Generic Distinguishing-H Attack on LPMAC
In this section, we present a generic distinguishing-H attack on a narrow-pipe Merkle-Damgård hash function. The attack complexity is 3·2 n 2 queries, 2 n 2 offline computations, and a memory to store 2 n 2 (n + b)-bit information. Moreover, the attack becomes memoryless with 6 · 2 n 2 queries and 2 some value. Then he generates 2 n/2 t 1 -block messages starting from the lengthprepend value t 1 and further computes t 2 − t 1 blocks at offline with the fixed value. By checking their match, the inner collision at H t1+1 can be detected with a good probability. The attacker can know the values of H t1+1 and H t2+1 by querying the colliding t 1 -block message and t 2 -block message, respectively. Therefore, by simulating the last t 2 − t 1 blocks at offline, which of h or r is instantiated can be detected.
Fig. 3. Internal Collision with Different Length-Prepend Values
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Attack Procedure
We assume that the MD-strengthening is used as the padding procedure of the underlying hash function, because it is adopted by most of widely used hash functions. The attack procedure is described in Alg. 1, which is also depicted in Fig. 4 . Note that the length-prepend value can be chosen by the distinguisher. The attack procedure returns a bit 1 if the underlying compression function is h and a bit 0 if the underlying compression function is r.
Attack Evaluation. Alg. 1 correctly returns a bit 1 only if the compression function is h.
Let us evaluate the probability that Alg. 1 returns a bit 1 when the compression function is h. In the above procedure, we generate 2 n/2 values for H 2 (= σ)
Algorithm 1 Distinguishing-H Attack
Input: a compression function algorithm h to be distinguished Output: a determining bit 0 or 1 1: Randomly choose the value of M 2 so that the padding string P 2 is included in the same block. 2: for 2 n/2 different values of M 1 do 3:
Query M 1 M 2 to obtain the corresponding tag σ 4:
Store the pair of (M 1 , σ ) in a table T . 5: end for 6: for 2 n/2 different values but the same length of M 1 whose padding string P 1 is included in the same block do 7:
Query M 1 and obtain the corresponding tag σ.
8:
Compute temp ← h(σ, M 2 P2) at offline. 9:
Check if the same value as temp exists in T . 10: if the same value exists then 11:
Replace
Query M 1 M 2 to obtain the corresponding tag σ .
13:
Compute temp ← h(σ, M 2 P2) at offline. 14:
if σ = temp then 15:
Return a bit 1.
16:
end if 17:
end if 18: end for 19: Return a bit 0. and 2 n/2 values for H 2 , and thus we have 2 n pairs of (H 2 , H 2 ). Hence, we have a collision (H 2 = H 2 ) with probability 1 − e −1 . If H 2 = H 2 , the simulated value temp and σ always become a collision due to the identical message in the last block. Note that we happen to have a collision at Step 9 even if H 2 = H 2 with probability 1 − e −1 . This collision is noise in order to detect the internal collision. However, with the additional check at Step 14, the internal collision pair (H 2 = H 2 ) also generates a collision for M 2 with probability 1, whereas the noise collision only produces another collision with probability 2 −n . Overall, Alg. 1 returns a bit 1 with a probability of 1−e −1 and this is a right pair making an internal collision with probability 1 − 2 −n ≈ 1.
Let us evaluate the probability that Alg. 1 returns a bit 1 when the compression function is r. An internal collision H 2 = H 2 occurs with probability 1 − e −1 . However, the collision between H 2 and H 2 is not preserved between temp and σ at Step 9. This is because σ is obtained by a query and thus σ = r(H 2 , M 2 P 2 ), whereas, temp is computed based on the algorithm of h at offline and thus temp = h(H 2 , M 2 P 2 ). The probability that r(H 2 , M 2 P 2 ) collides with h(H 2 , M 2 P 2 ) is 2 −n . As a result, we expect to obtain only one collision at Step 9, and the probability that this pair generates another collision at Step 14 is 2 −n . Overall, Alg. 1 returns 1 only with probability 2 −n . This is significantly smaller than the probability for the case of h.
Complexity Evaluation. The iteration at
Step 2 requires to query 2 n/2 2-block messages and to store 2 n/2 tag values and corresponding messages. Hence, the query complexity is 2 (n/2)+1 message blocks and the memory complexity is 2 n/2 (n + b) bits, where b is the block size. The iteration at Step 6 requires to query 2 n/2 1-block messages and to compute h for each of them. Hence, the query complexity is 2 n/2 message blocks and the time complexity is 2 n/2 compression function computations. Overall, the total attack cost is 3 · 2 n/2 message blocks in query, 2 n/2 h computations in time, and 2 n/2 (n + b) bits in memory.
Memoryless Attack. The core of the attack is a collision finding problem on an internal state, thus it can be memoryless with the well-known technique using the cycle structure. Because it needs a collision starting from two different length-prepend values, the problem is a memoryless meet-in-the-middle attack [21, Remark9.93] rather than a memoryless collision attack. To make the cycle, we define the computation from an internal state value s i to s i+1 as follows.
-If the LSB of s i is 0, apply procedure F. If the LSB of s i is 1, apply G. F : Convert an n-bit string s i into a b-bit string s Finally, the attack can be memoryless with double of the query and time complexities, which are queries of 6 · 2 n/2 message blocks and 2 (n/2)+1 computations of h.
Impact of the Attack. The goal of the attack presented in this section is the distinguishing-H attack. However, the attack not only distinguishes h from r, but also achieves a much stronger result, which is the recovery of the internal state. The knowledge of the internal state leads to much stronger attacks.
The first application is the length-extension attack. We use Fig. 3 to explain the attack. As explained in Sect. 3.1, our attack first recovers the internal state value h t1+1 . That is, we know that any t 2 -block message whose first t 1 blocks are fixed to M 1 M 2 · · · M t1 will result in the known collision value at h t 1 +1 . Therefore, for any (t 2 − t 1 )-block message M t 1 +1 · · · M t 2 , the attacker can compute the tag for
only with one offline computation (of t 2 − t 1 blocks) without knowing the value of K. In other words, the length-extension attack can be performed once an internal collision with different length-prepend values is detected.
One may suspect that this length extension attack is the same as the existential forgery because it requires O(2 n/2 ) queries. However, obtaining the knowledge of the internal state is actually stronger than the distinguish-R attack [7] because it forges the tag of a message of t 2 blocks long without any more query.
It may be interesting to see our attack from a different viewpoint. The security proof of LPMAC by Bellare et al. assumed the prefix-freeness of the construction, where the prefix-freeness means that any message is not the prefix of other messages. Due to the length-prepend values, LPMAC satisfies the prefix-freeness. However, an internal collision starting from different length-prepend values has the same effect as the prefix. In fact in the above explanation,
, and thus the lengthextension attack is applied. Note that our attack requires 3 · 2 n/2 queries and thus does not contradict with the security proof by Bellare et al. where LPMAC is a secure PRF up to 2 n/2 queries. One limitation of this length extension attack is that it only can forge the tag for messages of t 2 blocks long. We remove this limitation in the next section.
Generic Almost Universal Forgery Attack on LPMAC
The almost universal forgery attack was mentioned by Dunkelman et al. [5] . The original explanation by [5] is as follows.
we can find in linear time and space the tag of essentially any desired message m chosen in advance, after performing a onetime precomputation in which we query the MAC on 2 n/2 messages which are completely unrelated to m. The only sense in which this is not a universal forgery attack is that we need the ability to modify one message block in an easy to compute way.
In the attack by [5] , the first message block of the given message is modified by applying the XOR with two precomputed values.
In our attack, the attacker first determines parameter t, which is the limitation of the block-length of a message to be forged. For parameter t, the block length of the target message must be longer than d blocks and shorter than or equal to d + t blocks, where d = log 2 t . We perform a onetime precomputation; query tags for (t − 1) · 2 n/2 messages of at most d + t blocks long (in total O(2t 2 · 2 n/2 ) message blocks) which are completely unrelated to a target message M , and perform t · 2 n/2 offline computations of h. At the online stage, we replace the first d blocks of
Then, the attacker generates the tag for the modified message only with one offline computation (without any query).
Easiness and Hardness of Almost Universal Forgery Attack
Easiness of Almost Universal Forgery Attack on Various MACs. First of all, we point out that the almost universal forgery attack is trivial for various MACs with an iterated structure such as HMAC if the precomputation that queries O(2 n/2 ) messages is allowed. To achieve this, we can simply run the distinguishing-R attack by [7] . In details, we generate a pair of one-block messages (X 1 , X 1 ) which forms an internal collision. Then, for any given target
The corresponding tag is also the valid tag for
Hardness of Almost Universal Forgery Attack on Prefix-Free MACs. The above attack cannot be applied for prefix-free MACs such as LPMAC in an easy manner. Regarding LPMAC, if the length (not value) of the target message is given to the attacker, the almost universal forgery attack can be performed with the attack presented in Sect. 3.2. However, if the length is not given, performing the precomputation on LPMAC is hard. This is because, in LPMAC, the length-prepend value changes depending on the length of the message to be processed. Hence, without the knowledge of the length of the target message, performing the precomputation seems hard.
A simple method to deal with various length-prepend values in advance is performing the internal state recovery attack in Sect. 3.2 many times. Suppose that you apply the almost universal forgery attack for a message of blocks where 1 ≤ ≤ t, but the exact value of is unknown during the precomputation stage. You first assume = 1 and apply the internal state recovery attack with the O(2 n/2 ) complexity. Then, the value of is changed into 2, 3, . . . , t and the internal state recovery attack is performed for each of . Finally, the almost universal forgery attack can be performed for any -block message where 1 ≤ ≤ t with t times O(2 n/2 ) queries where each query consists of at most t-blocks. In the following part, we show another approach with the same complexity as the simple method at the order level, but seems to have more applications.
Overall Strategy
Our idea is constructing an internal multi-collision starting from various lengthprepend values as shown in Fig. 5 . Assume that a one-block message X makes a multi-collision for = 2, 3, . . . , 9, that is, h(h(IV, K 2), X) = h(h(IV, K 3), X) = · · · = h(h(IV, K 9), X). Also assume that the attacker knows the collision value denoted by Y . Then, for any message with the block length 2 to 9, we know that replacing the first block with X results in the chaining variable Y , and thus the computation for the remaining message blocks can be simulated at offline.
Finding a multi-collision within one block is very inefficient. For the MerkleDamgård structure, several constructions of the multi-collision are known as explained in Sect. 2.3. Considering that our multi-collision needs to start from different values due to different length-prepend values, the diamond structure [22] and multi-pipe diamonds [27] are suitable. The diamond structure was proposed for the herding attack and the multi-pipe diamonds were proposed for the herding attack on more complicated structures such as the cascaded construction or zipper hash. So far, we have not discovered the way to utilize the multi-pipe diamonds. We thus construct the multi-collision based on the diamond structure. The construction is described in Fig. 6 . 
